

MITTAL SLIP		DATE 9 FEB 1970
TO: Records Administration Branch, SSS		
ROOM NO. 702	BUILDING Magazine <i>gfb.</i>	
REMARKS: <p style="text-align: right;">10 Feb 70</p> <p><i>Gerry:</i> This continues our Vital Records Program but I believe you and I should talk about plans and guidance to RMO's and to C/A+Kc.</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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DD/S 70-0358

Executive Registry

70-573

3 FEB 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : CIA Emergency Planning

REFERENCES : a. Executive Director-Comptroller memo dtd
4 November 1969 (ER 69-5488)
b. DD/S memo dtd 13 December 1969 (DD/S 69-5504)
(ER 69-5488/3)

1. Paragraph 13 of this memorandum contains recommendations for your approval.

2. This memorandum is in response to your request for a study of the emergency planning program. It is addressed to the requirements of the basic directives which require an emergency planning program and shows, in practical terms, what communications, housing, office and other facilities we have to satisfy those requirements; what it is costing us to maintain these facilities in terms of manpower, space and equipment; what we have that is superfluous or unnecessary; and whether the scope of the plan and facilities as developed are adequate to meet the intended purpose of a relocation plan for the Agency at its present size and level of complexity.

3. The most current policy directive on emergency preparedness is Executive Order 11490 dated October 30, 1969. In this document President Nixon reaffirmed previous instructions on the subject of emergency planning and updated specific functional guidance to some 23 departments and federal agencies. There were no significant changes from the written policy of previous administrations. As in previous issuances on this subject there was no reference to intelligence community functions or command relationships nor was CIA assigned specific emergency planning functions.

4. CIA's responsibilities for emergency planning are contained in the general section of this Executive Order on the purpose and scope of emergency planning applicable to all departments and agencies.

"The departments and agencies of the Federal Government are hereby severally charged with the duty of assuring the continuity of the Federal Government in any national emergency type situation that might confront the nation. To this end, each department and agency with essential functions, whether expressly identified in this order or not, shall develop such plans and take such actions, including but not limited to those specified in this order, as may be necessary to assure that it will be able to perform its essential functions, and

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continue as a viable part of the Federal Government, during any emergency that might conceivably occur. These include plans for maintaining the continuity of essential functions of the department or agency at the seat of government and elsewhere, through programs concerned with: (1) succession to office; (2) predelegation of emergency authority; (3) safekeeping of essential records; (4) emergency relocation sites supported by communications and required services; (5) emergency action steps; (6) alternate headquarters or command facilities; and (7) protection of Government resources, facilities, and personnel. The continuity of Government activities undertaken by the departments and agencies shall be in accordance with guidance provided by, and subject to evaluation by, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness."

5. As Executive Agent for the President on emergency planning the Director of OEP is charged with the responsibility (Section 206 of Executive Order 11051) for reviewing all measures being undertaken by Federal Agencies with respect to the physical security and protection of facilities important to defense mobilization including those under the provisions of emergency preparedness assignments to such agencies and shall recommend to the President such actions as are necessary to strengthen such measures. The CIA emergency planning programs have always been, and continue to be, excluded from inspection and review functions of the Director, OEP.

6. In developing a rational program on emergency planning the Agency must distinguish between the printed word of official pronouncement and the actualities of an unstated but tangible attitude which has arisen the past few years. Congress has consistently refused to appropriate money to implement any of the proposals made by OEP or individual departments and agencies in support of a meaningful emergency relocation program. The classic illustration of this attitude was Congressional refusal to authorize the expenditure of funds for the hardening of emergency relocation sites, even after Presidential approval of a Cabinet paper urgently recommending that measure back in 1959.

7. In spite of the recent publication of a new Executive Order by President Nixon (EO 11490) reaffirming and supporting the original policy promulgated by earlier administrations, OEP as the President's executive agent for emergency preparedness has taken a passive role in implementing a meaningful national program. Meetings and conferences called by OEP have dropped sharply during the past year (none since March 1969). Planning activity remains on a status quo basis, old plans are reissued and related but not significantly changed and there is no active direction, incentive or inducement to push ahead to seek funds and manpower for realistic emergency programs. This attitude reflects the unwritten policy inherent in the

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fundamental change in the United States Soviet Bloc relationship of the past few years, whereby the crisis atmosphere of the 1950s and early 60s has passed and we are now concentrating our efforts on lessening tension and engaging in international arms talks, strategic weapons control agreements and the like. Thus an active, elaborate, expensive emergency preparedness program would be politically unacceptable and impossible to fund.

8. To meet our emergency preparedness responsibilities of Executive Order 11490 as enumerated in the seven general program areas cited in paragraph 4 above, it is proposed that our plan be in outline form and so structured that the principle provisions of the relocation and vital records programs could be rapidly implemented. We must recognize the fact that fund and manpower limitations prohibit realistic planning for continuity of essential functions in the event of surprise thermonuclear attack. As an intelligence organization our plans should be based on the assumption that we will have sufficient advance warning to implement the logistics, personnel documentation, and vital material aspects of our relocation planning.

9. Of the seven program areas mentioned in Executive Order 11490 (paragraph 4 above) three are not applicable to the CIA as these programs (2, 5 and 6) are concerned with departments and agencies with large domestic regional offices or who have been assigned specific emergency action steps in the Federal Emergency Plan. The remaining four programs applicable to CIA are detailed in the attachments to this memorandum and contain recommendations for changes in our current planning posture in these programs:

- a. Tab A: Program for Emergency Succession to Key Officials.
- b. Tab B: Vital Records Program (Safekeeping of Essential Records).
- c. Tab C: Program for Emergency Relocation Sites Supported by Communications and Required Services.
- d. Tab D: Program for Protection of Government Resources, Facilities, and Personnel.

10. In conclusion we must recognize that if we go by a literal interpretation of written policy and directives on emergency planning our programs are woefully inadequate. However, if we can judge our programs in relation to the actualities of the present intentions of the President and Congress as to what portion of our national assets are to be committed to non-military emergency preparedness, then we might conclude that the present scope of CIA programs adequately meet the current intended purposes of emergency preparedness planning.

11. Assuming the Agency's liaison responsibilities with the Office of Emergency Preparedness will remain at the same low level of activity we have experienced the past 18 months and that our participation in the Interagency Emergency Preparedness Committee (IEPC) stays at its current status of relative

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inactivity, the DDS/Support Services Staff can absorb these external liaison functions. I am recommending that [] Deputy Chief, Support Services Staff be designated CIA Emergency Planning Officer.

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12. As described in Tab D, the Agency's most active, fully staffed, and well defined emergency preparedness program elements are those presently administered by the Office of Security in fulfilling its responsibilities for the protection of government resources, facilities, and personnel. Through the CIA Emergency Security Patrol, the Security Command Center, and a network of Building Emergency Officers (assigned by the various Directorates) the Office of Security has a variety of identifiable resources committed to emergency preparedness programs. In the past the Office of Security has shouldered the bulk of our detailed emergency planning functions working under direction of the CIA Emergency Planning Officer and in collaboration with the Building Emergency Officers in the various Directorates. With the transfer of the CIA Emergency Planning Officer functions to the DDS, my Support Services Staff will assume the overall responsibilities previously assigned to [] and continue to look to the Office of Security for assistance and contribution to individual program elements.

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13. I request Executive Director approval of the following changes in the Emergency Planning Program:

a. The DDS/Support Services Staff assume overall responsibilities previously assigned to the CIA Emergency Planning Officer and that [] be designated CIA Emergency Planning Officer.

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b. Continue the current level of activity in the Program for Emergency Succession of Key Officials, recognizing that certain basic aspects which detail the conditions under which succession will take place, methods of notification, tenure of authority, and indoctrination programs are lacking.

c. The current scope and level of effort devoted to the Vital Records program be maintained, reaffirming the present operating policy which charges individual organizational components having non-hard copy deposits in Vital Records with the responsibility for earmarking specialized equipment now in use in their offices for transfer [] under an emergency relocation situation to insure the useability of their Vital Records deposits.

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d. All emergency supplies, materiel, and equipment (excluding communications gear) not used in support of [] activities be removed [] and relocated as detailed in Tab C, page 3, thus freeing urgently needed space for current operations.

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e. The Emergency Relocation Force roster be maintained on a position and job title basis rather than the present individual name basis.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

The recommendations contained in paragraph 13 are approved:

/s/ L. K. White

6 FEB 1970

L. K. White

Date

Executive Director-Comptroller

HEP/mrf (2 Feb 1970)

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1 - ER

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*Discussed in principle
with DCI 6 Feb 70.*

ls/ LKW

CC:



1012 Amos (3/13/70)

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PROGRAM FOR EMERGENCY SUCCESSION OF KEY OFFICIALS


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PROGRAM FOR EMERGENCY SUCCESSION OF KEY OFFICIALS

Successors to heads of departments and agencies should be designated to a minimum depth of eight at Headquarters plus five in separate locations outside of the Washington Capital area. Lists of successors should be submitted to OEP annually and updated as changes occur. The program should encompass conditions under which succession will take place, methods of notification, tenure of authority, and a training and indoctrination program for successors in the authority and the responsibility they would have should they succeed to the designated positions. The only portion of this program we have complied with is providing succession lists to the OEP. This is done by letter signed by the DCI, the most current of which was dated 23 January 1970. It is intended that the remaining portion of this program stay in its current inactive status.

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VITAL RECORDS PROGRAM
(Safekeeping of Essential Records)

TAB B

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
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VITAL RECORDS PROGRAM
(Safekeeping of Essential Records)

1. The purpose for which the Vital Records Program was created in 1952 by Executive Order No. 10346 was to select and protect that core of records deemed necessary to ensure a continuity of essential activities during national emergencies. The first step, prior to identifying those documents that are vital, is to develop a realistic and detailed functional statement of the mission and responsibilities of each component under an emergency situation which would require relocation and operation with a fraction of normal manpower and facilities. All previous efforts to obtain this basic guidance from operating components resulted in generalized responses to the effect that..."we would continue to do what we are now doing, but only on a smaller scale." Given this generalized guidance it has been exceedingly difficult for component vital records personnel to make realistic, meaningful selections of records which would be required in a national emergency relocation situation. The thrust of our vital records program has evolved into preparing for something less than a total war situation and is now primarily focused on providing back-up documentation for protection against the lesser emergencies arising from fire, flood and riots as well as from accidental damage resulting in loss of information on films and computer tapes.

2. We are under no illusion that our current Vital Records Program is void of deficiencies as it (as is the case with the general subject of emergency planning) has suffered from a lack of inducement, enthusiasm and manpower to keep it active and current. The link between Vital Records and Vital Materiel has not been resolved, again primarily due to a lack of funds to provide specialized equipment and facilities [] to process the non-hard copy materiel (NPIC negatives, OBGI map negatives, microfilm, and computer tapes) under an emergency relocation situation. Responsibility for providing specialized equipment (Vital Materiel) [] has never been clearly assigned, however in 1963 the CIA Emergency Planning Officer recommended that individual organizational components with non-hard copy deposits in Vital Records be charged with the responsibility for identifying, budgeting for, and procuring the specialized equipment needed to insure the usability of their Vital Records deposits. This policy has become the planning assumption under which [] our Vital Records Program is administered. This policy should be re-affirmed and components advised that their emergency relocation plans should include provision

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for identifying specialized equipment now in use in their respective offices which can be rapidly moved [] under an emergency relocation situation.

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3. In examining the Vital Records portion of our Emergency Plans we have concluded that the Agency cannot expect to recover significant manpower or records storage space through any alteration or diminution of the existing Vital Records Program.

a. The Records Center has assigned a man part-time to file and retrieve Vital Records [] The 46 components currently selecting office documents and making deposits to the Vital Records Collection all have other major duties for the personnel doing that work on a periodic basis. Similarly, the Agency's Central Records Staff has many duties besides the review and approval of Vital Records Schedules and their revision. No positions could be dropped if we were to completely terminate our Vital Records Program because no personnel are committed exclusively to this program.

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b. Of the 9,200 cubic feet of Vital Records in storage as of 1 January 1970 it is estimated that only about 2,000 cubic feet could be removed [] if the program was totally discontinued. The remaining 7,200 cubic feet of documents would be re-categorized and retained as back-up material by the Agency Records Center for emergency recall by operating components. For example, the 3,300 cubic feet of NPIC films and 3,000 cubic feet of OBGI original map negatives serve as both Vital Records and operational back-up. Likewise about two thirds of the CRS 1,100 cubic feet of negatives back up the master photos on file at Headquarters (in a room next door to an office that had a fire a few months ago). The remaining Vital Records deposits are individually small and diverse. We could gain only 1,500 cubic feet of space in the Records Center if we were to terminate the holdings of the other 43 components. We suspect that the components concerned would not permit destruction of these valuable documents and would recall most of them to their offices. Such an action would require about 200 additional safes (worth \$117,000) and over a thousand feet of Headquarters space to store those records. Further, if kept in the Headquarters offices these documents would not have even the limited protection the present dispersment affords and management might be criticized if we were found without some back-up records following an accident or emergency not of national catastrophe proportions.

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4. In sum, our Vital Records Program as it is now constituted does contain the required elements and is generally responsive to Executive Orders and related GSA instructions for implementing Federal Vital Records Program. As there are no significant savings to be gained in a redirection of our current efforts in this program and we cannot expect to obtain the manpower and funds to correct the known deficiencies, we recommend that scope and level of effort currently being extended this program be maintained.

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19 January 1970

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>VALUE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
I. GENERAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT			
a. Industrial and Engineering	\$10,200.00	Return to Headquarters for possible use or disposal through GSA	
b. Communication	1,000.00	Return to Headquarters	
c. Housekeeping (blankets, sheets, pillows, etc.)	26,000.00		25X1
d. Office Furniture	9,000.00	Local disposal	
e. Office Machines (dictaphones, typewriters, viewers, printers)	49,000.00	Return to Headquarters	
f. Administrative Supplies	6,800.00	Local Disposal	
g. Clothing and Tentage	50,000.00		25X1
h. Kitchen Equipment & Supplies	5,000.00		
Sub-Total	\$157,000.00		
II. MEDICAL			
a. Supplies	\$ 70,000.00	Through Headquarters to Military	
b. Radiation Equipment	30,000.00	Return to Headquarters	
Sub-Total	\$100,000.00		
III. FOOD			
a. Rations	\$ 60,400.00	Through Headquarters to Military (Army)	
b. Supplements (Soups and Coffee)	3,500.00	Return to Local Vendor	
Sub-Total	\$ 63,900.00		
GRAND TOTAL	\$320,900.00		

Tab C, Attachment I

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING FACILITIES

1. AGENCY

a. Secure Equipment

6 KW 7's
4 KW 26 Receivers
4 KW 26 Transmitters
1 KY 3

b. Associated Teletype Equipment

6 Automatic Send and Receive (ASR) Model 28
3 Keyboard Send and Receive (KSR) Model 28
4 HW 28's
2 Patchpanels

c. Purpose - The above equipment provides Staff Communications through if Headquarters relocates.

d. Approximate Cost: \$95,000

2. FBIS

a. Teletype Equipment

3 Automatic Send and Receive (ASR) Model 28
6 Keyboard Send and Receive (KSR) Model 28
1 Transmitter Distributor Bank with 6 Positions
1 Reperforator Bank with 6 Positions
1 Patch Panel with Associated Equipment

b. Purpose - This is FBIS Emergency Operating Facility for unclassified traffic (Press, etc.).

c. Approximate Cost: \$35,000

3. INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (ICS)

a. Equipment

7 KG 13's
12 HN 9's
3 ASR Model 37, Tape Preparation Units
1 ASR Model 37 with Telephone
2 HY 2's Secure Voice with Call Director's that have preempt capabilities
2 High Speed Send and Receive (HSSR) units with Call Directors that have preempt capabilities
1 Facsimile Unit with Call Director that has preempt capabilities
1 Kineplex with Call Director

b. Purpose - Provides Record Communications with other Agencies
Emergency Operating Facilities within ICS.

c. Approved For Release 2006/05/24 : CIA-RDP72-00039R000100450005-5
No cost to the Agency.

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Tab C, Attachment 2

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PROGRAM FOR PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT
RESOURCES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONNEL

TAB D

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**PROGRAM FOR PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT
RESOURCES, FACILITIES, AND PERSONNEL**

25X1 1. The Director of Security is responsible for planning and administering this aspect of our emergency preparedness program. [] established the CIA Emergency Security Patrol to protect classified material, installations, property, and personnel of the Agency in the United States in the event of an emergency, including fire, riot, natural disaster, enemy attack, or other circumstances.

2. Present regulations [] dated 1 April 1961) decentralizes building evacuation planning functions to the various directorates through a network of Building Emergency Officers. In actual practice the Office of Security formulates the plans, provides for their dissemination, holds lectures and maintains a continuous review of these plans. 25X1

3. The Director of Security maintains a Command Center to provide continual assistance during civil disturbances or other emergencies which might affect the normal operation of the Central Intelligence Agency. This Center, in Room 1-F-13, Headquarters Building, has the capability to communicate with all Agency occupied buildings in the Washington area, as well as with local, state, and national law enforcement agencies.

4. These are active, well-defined programs and meet the Agency's responsibilities contained in the Executive Order establishing these functions as a primary program in the overall emergency preparedness activities.

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GROUP 1
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